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THE ANDEAN COMMON MARKET'S COMMON REGIME
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Dale B. Furnish*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Andean Group (Andean Common Market or ACM) was
organized as a subregion of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) under the Agreement of Cartagena' in 1969. ACM
represents a new hope in Latin American economic integration and is
certainly the most positive stride forward since 1960. The ACM
subregional effort is probably more significant, however, for the
substance of its program than for the fact that it is composed of a
viable group of countries sharing similar dissatisfactions with the
evolution of LAFTA. In an ambitious "chronology," 2 the ACM
signatories pledged their new organization to a concentrated program
of drafting regulations to control two of the most sensitive areas of
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, Ariz-na State University. B.A.,
1962, Grinnell College; J.D., 1965, University of Iowa; LL.M., 1970, University of
Michigan.
Research for this article was assisted by a faculty grant-in-aid from Arizona
State University.
1. Acuerdo de Cartagena, sfgned at Bogotd, Colombia, 26 May 1969
[hereafter Acuerdo]. An English translation may be found in 8 INT'L L.
MATERIALS 910 (1969). The subregional agreement was approved by the
Permanent Executive Committee of LAFTA in its Resoluci6n 179 of 9 July 1969,
as compatible with the Treaty of Montevideo. The printed record of the
discussions and resolution in DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI 6 N, No. 6 at 118-36

(1970), indicates that the issue of subregional integration was settled beforehand
by Resoluciones 202, 203 and 222 of the contracting parties to LAFTA.
2. For a concise presentation of ACM's deadlines, see BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA The Andean Common Market 37 (published by Bus. INT'L 1970).
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operation that the subregional effort at development through integration is likely to encounter: viz., foreign investments3 and the
multinational corporation. 4 Both are matters of vital concern to the
developing countries of the Third World.'
In some ways, the first years of operation may have been the
easiest for ACM, despite its commitment to drafting rapidly regulations sufficient to deal with the complex problems of foreign
corporate investment. Following the establishment of a functioning
bureaucracy, ACM entered a brave initial period of hope. Yet drafting
policy standards, while not a simple matter, may be vastly more
simple than the task of making them work. Regardless, one notable
aspect of the ACM's drafting efforts is that their product may
represent the best indicia of current Latin American attitudes and
policies. If at all effective, ACM regulations should establish models
for years to come.
The case of foreign investment provides a noteworthy illustration.
A recent wave of expropriations in South America has foreign
investors concerned and edgy,6 but even the expropriating countries
are not happy with the undefined state of affairs that exists. Decision
24 of the ACM, along with its amendments, may represent the most
concrete resolution of the foreign investment problem possible in
Latin America today, and perhaps even the truest consensus of the
entire Third World. This treatment of the ACM's Rules on Foreign
Investment will be developed with these considerations in mind; i.e.
3. See Decision 24 of the ACM Commission, promulgated 31 December 1970.
Decisions 37 of 24 June 1970 and 37-A of 17 July 1970 amended the original
regulations. Properly titled Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and
of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties [hereafter Common Regime], the
English translation of the final version is available in 11 INT'L L. MATERIALS
126 (1972). The official decrees of each country in approving the Common
Regime are collected in GRuPo ANDINO, No. 9 (1971).
4. See Decision 46 of the ACM Commission, approved 31 December 1971, to
enter into effect by 30 June 1972. See generally Peruvian Times, Dec. 31, 1971,
at 3.
5. See, e.g., C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 479-536
(1970).
6. See, e.g., Wesley, Expropriation Challenge in Latin America: Prospectsfor
Accord on Standards and Procedures, 46 TUL. L. REV. 232 (1971);Symposium
-Foreign Investment in Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 175 (1971); Eder,
Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAWYER 611 (1970);
Foreign Investment in Latin America: Past Policies and Future Trends (Proceedings of a Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
published in 1970 by VA. J. INT'L L.).
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ACM Decision 24 and amendments are much more than an isolated
effort at solving a unique problem. Rather, they will be viewed here as
a benchmark and perhaps a landmark piece of legislation in an area of
vital importance to the development of the international economy.

A.

The Overall Scheme

The keynote of the new regulations is one familiar to those who
have followed discussions of the proper role for foreign capital in
developing nations. As stated in the preamble to the Andean Foreign
Investment Code,
The investment of foreign capital and the transfer of foreign technology
constitute a necessary

contribution to the development of Member

Countries... in the measure in which they really constitute a positive
contribution... [i.e.] stimulate capital formation in the country where
established, facilitate extensive participation of national capital in that
process, and not create obstacles to regional integration. 7
The refrain is not entirely new. It is perhaps significant that one of the
chief consultants and architects of the ACM's policy, Miguel
Wionczek, is from Mexico, a country that has had a restrictive policy
toward foreign investment for almost a generation.8
To assure that the policy described above is given concrete force,
the concept of "fade-out" has been written into the ACM regulations.
Basically, fade-out means that foreign investors, in order to take advantage of the subregion's duty-free trade, must sell control of their enterprise by a progressive divestment over fifteen years (twenty years in
Bolivia and Ecuador) after making the original investment.9 Hardened
cynics among foreign investors might observe that this is not so far
from current practice, where expropriation has occasionally followed
the establishment of a foreign enterprise by a generation or less. "
7. Translation from 11 INT'L L. MATERIALS 126-27 (1972), with some
change in word order.
8. See, e,g., BOHRISH & K6NIG, LA POLiTICA MEXICANA SOBRE
INVERSIONEs

EXTRANJERAS

JURiDICO

LAS

(1968); MENDEZ SILVA, EL REGIMEN
EN MEXICO

(1969);

RAMOS GARZA, MExIco ANTE LA INVERSION EXTRANJERA
WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO (1971).

(1971);

DE

INVERSIONES

EXTRANJERAS

9. Common Regime, arts. 27-37.
10.

For example, Gulf Oil was recently expropriated in Bolivia 16 years after

negotiating its entry into that country; Gulf Sulfur was forced to sell to domestic
capital about 20 years after beginning operations in Mexico; and Chile has most
recently nationalized several foreign investments of both short and long standing.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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Regardless of how true this may be, the new ACM plan establishes
rules for an ordered process of progressive transfer of control rather
than leaving the matter to abrupt and sometimes uncompensated
expropriation.
Although the fade-out provisions have attracted most attention
from foreign investors, " the drafters of the ACM's new regime
probably were more concerned with writing strict controls on the
transfer of technology in an attempt to cut off unconscionable hidden
profits and exploitation.' 2 Nonetheless, the fade-out provisions with
their specific period of years and percentages of divestment seem
particularly amenable to the sort of extensions, modifications, and
delays that often accompany time periods set out in Latin American
legislation. In addition, the countries of the ACM have invoked an
article of the Common Regime allowing each state individually to
exempt oil and gas, banking, insurance, utilities, transportation, mass
media and distribution of basic products from the regulations'
operation. "3This should have the effect of concentrating the impact
of the ACM regulations in the area of manufacturing, and may
heighten their role as an experimental approach to the foreign
investment problem by limiting their area of application.
While the ACM Common Regime represents a rallying point for
economists and planners of various camps, it also raises problems of
special interest to the lawyer. The first real confrontation between
national and putative supranational systems in Latin America has
occurred on its account. 14 For instance, the harmonization of
national laws is especially difficult where the range of domestic
attitudes toward foreign investment runs from Colombia's friendly
welcome to Peru's new nationalism to Chile's militant socialism. If the
participants in the subregion cannot administer a harmonious effort,
the subregion may fail to accomplish even a viable beginning in its
integration efforts. ,s

11. See, e.g., How Will Multinational Firms React to the Andean Pact's
Decision 24?, 25 INT.-AM. EcON. AFFAIRS 55 (1971); Wionczek, U.S. Reaction
to the Andean Group System for Treatment of Foreign Capital, 21 COMERCIO
EXTERIOR 27 (1971); May, An Analysis of the "Common Regime for Treatment
of Foreign Capital, Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties," (published by
the Council of the Americas 1970).
12. Common Regime, arts. 14-26.
13. See text accompanying note 96 infra.
14. See notes 106-15 infra and accompanying text.
15. Inner quarrels are cropping up already. See Peruvian Times, April 7, 1972,
at 3, reporting that Ecuador and Bolivia have complained that Peru and Chile have
violated their obligation to remove all non-tariff duties.
Spring, 1972
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B. Ethos for the Common Regime
Although this study is aimed at analyzing the basic scheme of
ACM's investment rules, with due attention to their legal ramifications
and to their effects upon Latin America and its overall integration
effort, some background discussion of the economic bases for the
ACM Commission's decision is probably necessary for a thorough
understanding of the problem. The ACM Common Regime has
crystallized a welter of evolving thought concerning foreign investment
in the Third World generally and in Latin America in particular. The
primary concern of the Andean Group planners has been for industrial
planning and development from the conception of the subregional
idea. 16 Industrial growth in the ACM is of course impossible without
substantial foreign investment and technology, and ACM's policy
makers know it. LAFTA not only slighted the industrial programming
component of its integration effort in favor of ineffective efforts at
creating free trade, but made it clear in 1967 that it would not
presume to dictate policy on foreign capital to its eleven member
states. The Declaration of American Presidents issued at Punta del
Este gave its unequivocal endorsement to the integration effort as a
means to development, but noted: "[f] oreign private enterprise will
be able to fill an important function in assuring achievement of the
objectives of integration within the pertinent policies of each of the
countries of Latin America." 17
The Andean subregion's leaders were already on record as favoring
closer regional supervision and control of foreign investment for its
"coordination with general development plans." '
By 1969, in the
negotiations toward the final treaty for subregional integration, the
drafters' attitude was sufficiently well-defined that they could express
a "common policy" of preference for "authentically national" capital
from member countries, while at the same time recognizing that

16. See, e.g., the statements of Salvador Lluch Soler, a Chilean long involved
in Latin American integration who has served as Executive Secretary of LAFTA
and as a member of the ACM Junta, in Pacto Andino: Alianza de los Pesos

Medianos, PANORAMA EcON6MIco, No. 245 at 7 (1969); and El Acuerdo de

Integraci6n Subregional Andino, apparently an internal document issued by the
ACM. A more official version is found in Origenes del Riglmen Comzn, GR UP 0
ANDINO, No. 1 at 3 (1971).
17. Declaration of the Presidents of America, 6 INT'L L. MATERIALS 535,
537 (1967).
18. Declaration of Bogota, 16 August 1966, in BANCO INDUSTRIAL DEL
PER6J, AcUERDO

(1969).
Vol. 5-No. 2

DE INTEGRACION

SUBREGIONAL

ANDINO

59, 66-67
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foreign capital and technology were necessary and "should receive
assurances of security consistent with the extent to which they
constitute a positive contribution." 19 This was the official policy
carried into the Cartagena Agreement of 1969 which created the
ACM, along with the obligation to supplement the policy with a
regulatory scheme by December 31, 1970, slightly more than nineteen
months after the agreement was signed. 20 Although the timetable was
swift, and many countries, as well as foreign companies, feared the
results of precipitous action, 2 the ACM planners were able to draw
on substantial existing expertise and thought, much of it originating in
the United States. 22
The economic theory reflected in the Common Regime is neither
new nor unorthodox. It has been developed in recent years by many
Latin American economists. 23 In essence, this theory, which has been

19. Declaration of Lima, 24 November 1969. Similar attitudes were expressed
for all of Latin America in the Concensus of Vina del Mar. See 8 INT'L L.
MATERIALS 974 (1969); Rogers, United States Investment in Latin America: A
CriticalAppraisal,11 VA. J. INT'L L. 246 (1971).
20. Acuerdo, art. 27.
21. A good summary of investors' reaction is that in Peruvian Times, April 23,
1971, at 6; Wionczek, supra note 11.
22. A complete list of those individuals most directly involved in the actual
drafting is in Or/genes del Regfmen ComLn, GRUPO

ANDINO,

No. 1 at 4-5

(1971). In addition, discussions and studies obviously drew heavily on the work of
Raymond Vernon and his team at the Harvard Business School, most notably
VAUPEL

&

CURHAN,

THE MAKING

OF INTERNATIONAL

ENTERPRISE

(1969). Another influential source of policy considerations is Hirschman, How to
Divest in Latin America and Why, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE,
No. 76 (1969).
23. For those whose interest is more general, the author found two recent
articles especially helpful, in addition to Hirschman, supra note 22: Sunkel, Big
Business and "Dependencia," 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 517 (1972); Garcia,
Industrializationy Dependencia en America Latina, 38 TRIMESTRE EcON6MI-

co 731 (1971).
There is an abundance of material on the subject. Among the more prominent
sources are:

CARDOSO

&

FALETTO, DEPENDENCIA

Y DESARROLLO EN

AMERICA LATINA (1969); DOS SANTOS, EL NUEVO CARACTER DE LA
DEPENDENCIA (1969); FURTADO, Los ESTADOS UNIDOS Y EL SUBDESARROLLO DE AMgRICA LATINA (1971); JAGUARIBE, LA DEPENDEN-

CIA POLiTICO-ECON6MICA DE AMERICA LATINA
EL SUBDESARROLLO

LATINOAMERICANO

(1970); SUNKEL & PAZ,

Y LA TEORIA DEL SUBDE-

(1970). In addition, the Latin American journals contain many
articles by these and other authors on the subjects of foreign investment and
SARROLLO

dependencia.
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accepted by the ACM's planners, is that Latin American foreign
investment in a majority of cases has evolved in such a way as to
create and perpetuate a crippling dependency on the technologically
advanced investing nations; i.e. the United States. Perhaps as good a
synthesis of orthodox "dependent industrialization" economics as may
be found is that of Antonio Garcia:
[It is a] process characterized by ... diversification of the productive sector
and the instigation of new participant classes in the limited spectrum of
traditional Latin American society.... [B] ut at the same time more basic
structures are not changed and instead new, dynamic, and subtle mechanisms of domination and dependency are introduced.... [I] ndustrialization has generated technological and institutional modernization, accelerated urbanization and concentration of population, and modified the
physical image of Latin America, but at the cost of establishing an economy
split by technical dualism, preserving internal (latifundista) structures of
domination, not altering the colonial foundations of the primary-exporter
economy, and adding to traditional forms of financial and commercial
dependence a new dependency: technological-financial colonialism. 24
Although developed and elaborated by many economists, the new
industrial colonialism of which Garcia writes was applied to the task
of drafting a common regime for foreign investment and technology in
the ACM by Miguel Wionczek, the Mexican economist. Without
attempting to criticize Wionczek's formulation or to classify it
according to its proper place in the mass of writing on dependent
industrialization, I offer here a brief extract from the documents-pre-

pared by Wionczek and Constantin Vaitsos-that served5 as basic

reference for the drafters of the Andean Common Regime. 2
Wionczek begins with the proposition that foreign investment has
moved over the past decade solidly into manufacturing sectors in

24. Garc'a, supra note 23, at 731.
25. It may be unfair to give Wionczek as much credit as I have here. In any
case, he has quite clearly assumed primary responsibility for explaining the bases
of the ACM's foreign investment policy. His works include: Hacia el Establecimiento de un Trato Comn para la Inversi6 n Extranjera en el Mercado Comzun
Andino, 38 TRIMESTRE EcONdMIco 477 (1971); U.S. Reaction to the Andean
Group System for Treatment of Foreign Capital, 21 COMERcio EXTERIOR 27
(1971); and a series of internal documents prepared for the ACM Junta, including
El Grupo Andino y la Inversion Extranjera Privada (1970), Problems Involved in

the Establishment of a Common Agreement for ForeignInvestment in the Andean
Common Market (1970), Latin American Economic Integration and Foreign

Private Investment (1970) (with Saavedra), and La Banca Extranjera en America
Latina (1970). See also Vaitsos, Strategic Choices in the Commercialization of
Technology: The Point of View of Developing Countries (1970).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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preference to traditionally-favored sectors such as mining, communications, utilities and commerce. This investment has not taken integration seriously to date; it has not expanded its planning to contemplate
regional and subregional markets. On the contrary, according to the
theory, it has in fact been a counterweight to economic integration
insofar as it is apt to move behind the domestic tariff walls of each
individual country and serve the national market, with neither desire
nor plans to go beyond. This has led to repetition of the same sorts of
investment and installation in several countries, rather than attempts
to rationalize manufacture of a given item by maximum efficiency
installations in a single country designed to serve a given area.
Wionczek and the other economists who have analyzed this
phenomenon are not impressed by the data that indicate that the
return on foreign investment is lower in Latin America than in any
other part of the Third World. 6 They tend to discount the net profit
figure and look to hidden profits such as those taken by overpricing
on sales of capital goods and assembly parts by parent companies to
foreign subsidiaries, charges for services and technological transfers
(often by requiring payment of royalties on patents and processes not
used, as a condition for the use of a necessary patent or process),
exhorbitant loans and financing charges by the parent corporation to
its subsidiaries, and profits remitted to the parent but discounted by a
revaluation of assets in the host country. Wionczek notes that the
return on Latin American investment belies the amount and breadth

of involvement and concludes that the "fact that every attempt to
investigate foreign investment in Latin America finds itself before a
wall of silence on the part of the companies about their cost
accounting [which] suggests that very strange things-to put it
mildly-are happening in this respect."2 In addition to the problems
of access to hard and reliable data, few studies exist regarding the
operations of foreign enterprises in Latin America or the subregion,
perhaps because Latin American countries have had neither the
bargaining power to require disclosure nor the expertise to know what
to ask for and how to analyze it. However, Wionczek and his brethren

26. The most commonly cited sources of returns on investment in Latin
America are the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Council for the Americas.
See Peruvian Times, April 23, 1971, at 6; May, The Effects of United States and
Other Foreign Investments in Latin America, (published by the Council of the
Americas 1970).
27. Wionczek, Problems Involved in the Establishment of a Common
Agreement for Foreign Investment in the Andean Common Market, supra note
25, at 14.
Spring, 1972
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are not vindictive. 28 It is not punishment for past sins they seek in
exposing these practices but rather guidelines for the future.
The scheme that has been conceived and promulgated by the ACM
planners is a common regime that depends for its administration upon
the national government of each member state in the subregion; it is
not a supranational regime. Individually, no Andean country has had
either the clout or the expertise necessary to drive a hard bargain with
foreign investors. In large part, they have been forced to rely on the
blunt instrument of expropriation to assert themselves. Now the
subregion has set out to instigate a comprehensive scheme of controls
calculated to bend foreign investment to the needs of each country
and the subregion. To accomplish this goal, the drafters of the
Common Regime were concerned with coordinating answers to the
following inter-related problems: 29
(1) planned growth of the various industrial sectors to provide
balanced development throughout the subregion and in each
country;

(2) decisional control of foreign enterprise;
(3) foreign acquisitions of domestic enterprise;
(4) utilization of national sources of finance by foreign enterprise;
(5) levels of dependency associated with the introduction of
foreign technology;
(6) regulation of repatriation of capital and profits; and,
(7) policies toward subregional multinational corporations and
mixed (foreign and national capital) enterprises.

II.

INTEGRATION, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

The planners of the Andean Group and the drafters of the
Common Regime were concerned primarily with insuring that foreign
investment play a supporting, rather than a negative, role in
integration and economic development of the subregion. To the
extent that foreign enterprise has had undesirable effects on development goals of individual countries or the efforts at integration, all
blame may not be laid at the doorstep of foreign companies. In fact,
foreign investors may have behaved in a way that showed they were

28. But see Pazos, El Financiamiento Externo de la Ambrica Latina, 38
No. 150 (1971).
29. This is a hybrid list gleaned primarily from Wionczek and Guerrero, El

TRIMESTRE EcON6MIco,

Rggimen Comln de la Inversi6n Extranjera en el Grupo Andino, DERECHO DE
LA INTEGRACION, No. 8 at 11 (1971).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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aware of and responsive to changing currents of economic legislation
in Latin America. After World War II, much of the foreign investment
in the Andean countries was concentrated in traditional areas such as
petroleum, mining, transport and communications. These countries
switched to emphasis on import substitution by drafting protectionist
systems behind which both foreign and domestic investment could
take shelter against outside competition. Typically, "industrial
development" laws provided that progressively greater percentages of
national inputs had to be utilized in the production of tariff protected
items, but placed no restrictions on foreign ownership or control. 30
By the time the Agreement of Cartagena was signed, foreign
investment was entrenched solidly in the manufacturing sector-viz.,
automobiles, processed food items, chemicals, metallic products and
similar enterprises- of Andean economies. These import substituting
enterprises undoubtedly have had deleterious effects on development, 31 but often only because they were behaving rationally in the
light of existing national laws and conditions. Investments in the
manufacturing sector often involved the installation of inefficient
plants since investors tended to be concerned primarily with taking
advantage of tariff barriers to reach a previously restricted market. In
many cases, where plants were simple assembly centers, even the
import substitution goal was essentially unrealized because import of
finished products was replaced by import of most component parts.
Prices were not forced downward on items manufactured in an
inefficient manner by assembling mostly imported parts behind high
tariff walls. In addition, there was often little chance of export
because if costs had not foreclosed successful international competition, planners of the foreign investment often did not contemplate
exports since they did not wish to compete with their own subsidiaries
in other countries.
Albert Hirschman underscores other, perhaps more subtle, effects
of this phenomenon. He notes that the presence of foreign investment

30. See, e.g., Industrial Development Law, Ley No. 13270 of 30 November
1949 (Peru); D.F.L. 258 of 30 May 1960 (Chile).
31. See sources cited notes 23, 25 supra. See also Origines del Regimen
Comln, GRUPo ANDINO, No. 1 at 5-8 (1971); Ikonicoff, Las Inversiones
Extranjeras en Ambrica Latina, GRupo ANDINO, No. 2 (1971). Able syntheses
include Grunwald, Foreign Private Investment: The Challenge of American
Nationalism, 11 VA. J. IN T'L L. 228, 234-36 (1971); Guerrero, supranote 29, at
11-12.
32. Hirschman, Como y Por Que Desinvertir en la A mbrica Latina 4-5 (ACM

internal version; published versions unavailable to author).
Spring, 1972
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and technology may stunt the incipient growth of a country by
creating permanently missing factors of production. Domestic enterprises might respond if forced to provide missing elements, but often
they will rely instead on the foreign sector to supply them. In other
words, foreign investors ultimately compete with budding or potential
domestic enterprises and prevent rather than complement their
development. Since the competition is hardly between equals and
because foreign investment seeks the dynamic sectors of the economy,
domestic industry consistenly loses and is shut off from the most
promising areas of endeavor. 32
Another problem is that where important segments of any sector
are controlled by foreign capital, "irrational" government behavior
toward the sector may result. 11 First, foreign interests may tend to
tread more softly in the host country than nationals would, thus
providing less effective communication with the government. Secondly, the government may trust foreign interests less or discriminate
against them for political reasons even when they do press for
legitimate development measures. Because the government may be
concerned that it not benefit or strengthen the position of the foreign
sector, "many policies which are aimed to 'squeeze' the foreigner,
have proved irrational from an economic development point of
view." 3 4 Finally, countries often have been most occupied in recent
years with establishing sovereignty over their basic resources in the
traditional areas of foreign investment, so that they may have devoted
less time to understanding and dealing with circumstances and effects
of more recent trends in foreign investment. 11
From its inception, the ACM, with its emphasis on balanced
industrial planning and development, has turned its focus on the
dynamic manufacturing sector. As contemplated in the Agreement of
Cartagena, 16 the ACM Commission has officially set aside about 600
products to be reserved to the subregion's Sectorial Programs of
Industrial Development. 11 Consistent with the expressed aims of
industrial programming included in ACM's basic treaty, the sectorial
programs must serve the following objectives: expansion, diversification and specialization of the subregion's industry; maximum use of
available resources; greater economies of scale, productivity and
efficiency; and equitable distribution of benefits among participating

33. Hirschman, supra note 32, at 7-9.
34. Grunwald, supra note 31, at 235.
35. See Guerrero, supra note 29, at 12.

36. Acuerdo, arts. 33-35.
37. Decision 25 of 31 December 1970.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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countries. 38 The reserved products fall into roughly seven sectors, all
solidly part of the dynamic manufacturing part of the subregional
economy: basic metallurgy, nonmetallic minerals, chemicals and
petrochemicals, pulp and paper, auto parts and capital goods,
electrical and electronic products and food processing. 31 By the end
of 1973, the ACM should have drafted plans assigning the location of
industries to various ACM member states. 40 In addition, 73 items
currently not produced in any of the ACM countries have been
reserved-34 to Bolivia and 39 to Ecuador. 41
To make operational its ambitious attempt at planning, the ACM
almost certainly must rely on strong cooperation from foreign
investment. The subregion alone probably cannot muster sufficient
resources, capital, technology, and administrative expertise. Thus it
wants and needs foreign investment, but is wary of its past
performance and effects and is determined to draft wise controls to
turn foreign enterprise to the ACM's developmental ends, rather than
against them. 42 Industries that have over time duplicated inefficient
installations and operations in several ACM countries ought now to
take a subregional view and eliminate such duplication. Another
consideration is that if the Junta and Commission go about creating
comprehensive plans for various products and sectors, their objectives
will be served only if the entire plan is in fact carried out. Partial lack
of realization can defeat virtually every concern of the plan's drafters
and the subregional integration effort by skewing benefits to those
countries that are best able to comply with their assigned portions of
sectorial development.
The principal goal of the Common Regime is coordination of
national concerns within the subregional context. Because of the
sectorial and other planning activities, 4 3 the ACM also is assured of a

38. See Acuerdo, art. 32. If any were needed, renewed emphasis on the
importance of industrial planning was given in the Declaration of Cuzco, 13 March

1971, signed by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all five ACM members. See 20
COMERcio EXTERIOR 7-10 (1971).
39. BuSINEss LATIN AMERICA, The Andean Common Market 37 (published by Bus. INT'L 1970).

40. Acuerdo, art. 47.
41. Decision 28 of 31 December 1970.
42. See Guerrero, supra note 29, at 12-13; Wionczek, Problems Involved in
the Establishment of a Common Agreement for ForeignInvestment in the Andean
Common Market, supra note 25, at 39-52.

43. Examples include those that will be carried on by the Andean
Development Corporation. See Agreement Establishing the Andean Development
Corporation, 8 INT'L L. MATERIALS 940 (1969).
Spring, 1972
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strong voice in subregional industrialization. The Common Regime has
given responsibility and control to member countries, each of whom
must set up a "competent national authority" to pass on all foreign
investments, which should be authorized only after a full disclosure
and justification of their projects by potential investors." It is
anticipated that there will be some bargaining between governments
and applicants in order to achieve the sort of disclosure of the
probable impact of a given project that often has been lacking in Latin
American host countries. 45 Once into the host country, the foreign
enterprise is subject to the Common Regime's provisions for constant
vigilance and disclosure to the competent national authority which
admitted it 4 6 of the foreign investor's operations. There is in all of
these devices less of a concrete plan for development than a firm belief
in the potential for strong and balanced development wherever host
countries and the subregional agencies have full knowledge of
performance and activities, an informational advantage Latin American
planners have lacked heretofore. There are more specific limitations
on nlational administration-e.g., foreign capital may acquire existing
domestic enterprise only in the case of its imminent bankruptcy and
lack of domestic purchasers; and foreign enterprises may not be
authorized where existing domestic enterprise "adequately covers" the
activity4 7-but the overall thrust is one of confidence in the ability of
national and international interests to forge an effective program
within flexible and evolutionary limits when an adequate information
flow has been established.

III. THE FADE-OUT

One of the primary tenets of the dependencia doctrine is that while
foreign enterprise can fill legitimate breaches in the industrial complex
of Latin American economies, it often perpetuates the breach by
taking over permanent responsibility for providing the "missing"
factor when potential domestic competitors succumb to the tendency
not to compete with an obviously superior enterprise. Another
complaint concerning foreign capital is that it has a history of
44. Common Regime, art. 2, requires that all applications must follow the
comprehensive model appended as Annex No. 1 ("Guidelines for the Authorization, Registration and Supervision of Foreign Investments").
45. See Guerrero, supra note 29, at 24.
46. Common Regime, arts. 5-6, 12, 14-15, 45.
47. Common Regime, art. 3.
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acquiring the more efficient and progressive domestic enterprises, 48
thus co-opting those national elements that hold the best hope of
filling the breaches exploited by foreign investors.
The ACM has responded to these particular problems by including
the already well-known fade-out provisions in its Common Regime.4 9
It is probably the fade-out provisions, more than any other part of the
Common Regime, that have led to its characterization as a scheme of
"anti-foreign bias" and the work of "mainly professors and institutional advisors, whose collective attitude toward foreign investment
was on the negative side at best."' 0 In summary, the fade-out applies
to virtually all foreign investments in the manufacturing sector"1
existing or established after July 1, 1971, and means that majority
ownership and control must be progressively turned over to national
or subregional capital within fifteen or twenty years, depending on
whether the investment is in Chile, Colombia, or Peru or in Bolivia or
Ecuador. 2 In the three larger countries, minimum standards of
progressive fade-out are 15 per cent ownership and control to national
investors (including public or private capital from any of the ACM
countries or from the Andean Development Corporation)5 3 by the
time production begins, 30 per cent after no more than five years and
45 per cent after no more than ten years, and 51 per cent after no
more than fifteen years.5 4 Bolivia and Ecuador, due to their relatively
less developed status, have a total of 22 years in which to program
foreign divestment. A twenty year period begins to run two years after

48. See Wionczek, Problems Involved in the Establishment of a Common
Agreement for Foreign Investment in the Andean Common Market, supra note

25, at 7-26 (country-by-country analysis indicating that about half to a third of
foreign investments in the manufacturing sectors have been acquisitions of
existing enterprises in ACM countries).
49. Common Regime, arts. 27-37.
50. 18 Bus. INT'L, Supplement to The Andean Common Market 2 (1971).
51. An exception is made for those foreign enterprises (any business having
less than 51% national investment, as defined in article 1 of the Common Regime)
that do not wish to participate in the advantages of the subregional duty-free
commercial traffic. Common Regime, arts. 27, 34.
52. Common Regime, art. 30.
53. Common Regime, art. 35. This is a modification of the original provision,
which would have required a first refusal to the host state on each divestment.
The change is probably due to Colombia's strong opposition to the original
provision. See Peruvian Times, July 2, 1971, at 3.
54. Common Regime, art. 30. The standards set out here are the most lenient
permitted. Any country may impose stricter time periods or greater percentages
of divestment. Id. art. 33.
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production begins, with 5 per cent control and ownership to be in the
hands of national investors three years after beginning production, 10
per cent at nine years, and 35 per cent at fifteen years, with a final
period of seven years in which to divest the last 16 per cent up to 51
55
per cent.
All new investment must come into the ACM on the basis of an
approved fade-out plan, but existing foreign investments have three
years to decide whether to commit themselves to a process of
divestment." To take advantage of the benefits of duty reduction
under the Cartagena Agreement, foreign companies must agree to fade
out.5 7 If they choose to divest, they must have sold at least 15 per
cent of control to national capital at the end of the third year from
the effective date of the Common Regime, June 31, 1974.58
Otherwise, the time periods and percentages for fade-out are the same
as for new investments, but the grace period of three years may be
important. In the long run, assuming effective integration, it is unlikely
that it will benefit any existing business to forego participation in the
subregional program and suffer the competition of duty-free products
from more efficient competitors. In the short run, however, an
entrepreneur may use his three years' grace to test the climate for
foreign investment in the ACM. If his evaluation is a pessimistic one,
or if he has special circumstances to consider, he may find it

advantageous to maintain 100 per cent control, take his short-term
profits while he can and then assume a loss when forced out at some
future date. In the meantime, such an investor may buy time in the
hope that events or policies will shift in his favor or that the ACM
program will fail to prove effective. Especially if the conditions
imposed by the ACM or the country in which he is situated became
less favorable to foreign investment, he may be no worse off in fifteen
or twenty years than those who choose to apply for participation in
the fade-out program. Indeed, he will have realized proportionately
greater profits in the meantime.
In time, existing foreign investors who choose not to fade out
should be the only foreign controlled enterprises in the manufacturing
sectors of the ACM. Possible avenues of circumvention or entry have
been carefully foreclosed. Acquisition of existing domestic enterprises
55. Common Regime, art. 30.
56. Common Regime, art. 28.
57. Common Regime, art. 27. The basis for control is through certificates of
origin, which will be issued only to companies that have achieved mixed or
national status (as defined in article 1) or are in the process of transforming
themselves to achieve it. Id., art. 24.
58. Common Regime, art. 28.
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is prohibited except where bankruptcy is imminent and no national
investor comes forward. Even then, the foreign investor must enter
under a fade-out agreement divesting control in fifteen years or less,
according to terms negotiated with the competent national authority.59 Foreign capital may be allowed to participate in existing
enterprise to increase its capital, but only so long as it does not take
majority control away from national capital.6 0
Foreign enterprise has turned increasingly to internal credit to
finance its Latin American operations. 6 ' This has proved to be a
sound business practice because national banks have found established
foreign investors to be better credit risks than the usual national
borrower. Consequently, loans are relatively easy for the former to
obtain. Moreover, inflation may create negative real interest rates-an
official policy often utilized to redistribute income, but badly
misapplied insofar as the redistribution is to large foreign industry at
the expense of national interests. Finally, foreign enterprises may turn
to local sources of credit in order to avoid utilizing precious company
capital and, where the debtor has subsidiaries in several countries, it
62
may be able to juggle finances to derive still additional benefits.
Under the Common Regime, however, foreign access to local credit is

drastically curtailed. Under the original plan, all local credit would
have been prohibited except in exceptional circumstances, but a
modification before the regulations became effective allows short-term
63
credit for new foreign investment.
The sum of all the Common Regime's provisions on control,
acquisitions and finance is to drive foreign investment to the
negotiating table with competent local authorities of the country in
which the investment would be placed. Since in many cases only one

59. Common Regime, art. 3.
60. Common Regime, art. 4. In some cases, national capital must constitute
not less than 80% of control.
61. See M. WIONCZEK, LA BANCA EXTRANJERA EN AMERICA LATINA

(1970).

62. See Guerrero, supra note 29, at 22.
63. Common Regime, art. 17. Like other provisions in the ACM regulations,
this article probably reflects Peruvian legislation, in this case Decree-Law 18858 of
19 May 1971. If the ACM follows the general outline of Peru's approach,
short-term credit may be permitted to the total of the company's capital and
reserves, but only for loans of a year or less. When the term is over a year,
short-term credit in Peru is limited to three times the value of the locally-owned
portion of the enterprise. See Peruvian Times, July 2, 1971, at 3. The ACM will
promulgate its own regulations by Commission decision. Common Regime, art.
17.
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ACM country will be designated as proper for a given investment,"
no battle of incentives should develop between member countries. By
the same mechanism, the bargaining power of the ACM member with
the potential investor should steadily increase since a greater market is
at stake and the investor cannot seek entry through another country.
Thus, the fade-out mechanism should be imposed throughout the
dynamic import substitution sectors in order to assure avoidance of
crippling dependencia by forcing the initiative on national capital."
Several problems with the ACM scheme seem noteworthy. Although the theory seems viable, it ultimately depends upon the
existence of sufficient national capital6 6 to acquire the progressive
percentages of ownership offered by foreign investors as they fade out
of ACM enterprises. Wionczek estimates that in 1966-67, foreign
investments in the five ACM countries totaled $3,052,000,000. Of this
total, $369,000,000 was in manufacturing enterprises.6 7 If foreign
investors tender shares in accord with their fade-out agreements and
available national captial to carry out the purchase is not forthcoming,
it is hard to believe that either national or ACM authorities would
insist on the sanction of article 32 of the Common Regime, which is
designed to take away the benefits of the subregional integration
program until the scheduled divestment is complete. More likely, some
form of moratorium would be worked out.
Even if sufficient capital is available to make all fade-out purchases
on time, the success of the program will still depend upon the vigor
with which it is administered in each country by the "competent local
authority." There are requirements in the Common Regime that will
assist the individual authorities in their vigilance and control: all
foreign investments, existing or new, must be registered;6" and bearer
stocks, common in the ACM, must be converted to registered
sbares. 69 Ultimately, however, registry, vigilance and all other
elements of effective control must be generated and sustained by the
national authorities. This is an area of the Common Regime that seems
64. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text. See also Common Regime,

Temporary Provision H (proscribing such competition).
65. Article 31 of the Common Regime contains the required elements of the
agreement to be negotiated between national authorities and foreign investors.
66. For the purposes of figuring fade-out percentages, "national investors"
include the Andean Development Corporation or investors from any ACM
country. Common Regime, art. 30.
67.

M. WIONCZEK, EL GRUPO ANDINO Y LA INVERSION EXTRANJERA

6-7 (1970).
68. Common Regime, art. 5, Temporary Provision B.
69. Common Regime, art. 45.
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particularly amenable to ad hoc modification and shadings of
application. Although the general principle that increasing national
ownership and control is necessary to combat dependencia would
probably be accepted by all ACM member countries, there is wide
divergence in specific approach to foreign investment."
If these
differences manifest themselves in varying standards applied by the
national authorities responsible for enforcement, the objective of
subregional planning and coordination could be defeated.
IV.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, REPATRIATION AND DEPENDENCIA

Technology transfers probably constitute the most complex matter

taken up by the Common Regime. As in the area of investments
generally, ACM planners and economists feel that there is a great lack of
knowledge regarding precisely how transfers of technology have been
carried out, under what terms, and at what profits to the supplier,
with what ultimate effects on internal policies and interests of
recipient states.7 1 Nonetheless, it is generally recognized that the

negative effects have been many, again perhaps because suppliers have
been economically rational in maximizing profits where they found
that they could exploit weak bargaining positions on the part of
recipients and lack of expertise in handling the questions on the part
of governments. 72 Specific complaints against technology transfer include its use as a hidden means of repatriating capital by the simple
expedient of over charging for an item of technology or by tying
unnecessary technology to a contract for one desired item so that
there is payment for all instead of one. This is of course not the only
method of hidden repatriation that foreign investors have used. 73 The
Common Regime has taken pains to see that most of the known
possibilities for sub rosa repatriation are curtailed. Again, the basic

mechanism is one of registration and disclosure.

70. See Peruvian Times, January 8, 1971, at 3-4.
71. The best overviews and analyses of the subject, which bring together most
of the existing data and thought, are easily VAITSOS, STRATEGIC CHOICES IN
THE COMMERCIALIZATION

OF TECHNOLOGY: THE POINT OF VIEW OF

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1970); VAITSos, TRANSFER OF RESOURCES
AND PRESERVATION OF MONOPOLY RENTS (1970); and SABATO, PRO-

(1970).
72. See Aracama-Zorraquin, El Derecho de las Patentes en America Latina,
DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION, No. 9 at 75 (1971).
73. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
DUCCION Y COMERCIALIZACI6N DE TECNOLOGiA

74. Common Regime, Temporary Provision E.
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All agreements on foreign patents, trademark licensing and other
existing74 or new 75 technical assistance arrangements must be
registered with the designated national authority. All such contracts
are also subject to approval by the recipient national authority, which
must make an appraisal of "the effective contribution" of the
technology in question. 76 Apparently, this means that some measure
must be made of the incremental profits that should result from the
use of the technology.' To prevent the inclusion of useless technology
in transfer agreements, all such contracts must include and clearly
identify the value of each element of technology.7 8 Transfers of
intangible technology may not be computed as capital contributions
to ACM-based enterprises.7 9 In addition, the ACM Commission may
intervene to review patent privileges already granted and to set aside
"production processes, products, or groups of products, with respect
to which no patent privileges may be granted in any of the Member
Countries." 8
The Common Regime specifies a maximum profit of 14 per cent
over capital per year, all of which may be repatriated to the home
company. 8 ' To guarantee against hidden profits and repatriations and

75. Common Regime, art. 6(f).

76. Common Regime, art. 18. Without such prior approval no remittance of
royalties in foreign exchange vill
be permitted. Id., art. 21.
77. See Schliesser, Restrictions on Foreign Investments in the Andean
Common Market, 5 INT'L LAWYER 586, 596 (1971).
78. Common Regime, art. 19. Clauses providing for royalty payments on
unused patents or trademarks are prohibited. Id., arts. 20(g) and 25(d).
79. Common Regime, art. 21.
80. Common Regime, art. 26.
81. Common Regime, art. 37. The figure of 14% return should not be a
disincentive to invest in Latin America. If figures or profits from other areas are
reliable, 14.1% is the highest profit being made by U.S. investors in any part of
the world except for recently reported returns of 28.7% in the Middle and Far
East. See note 26 supra and authorities cited there. There may be some question
whether the 14% profit is a binding figure for ACM countries and for all foreign
investments. In applying the Common Regime in Ecuador, that country
specifically excepted the basic products (petroleum and other minerals and forest
exploitation) from the 14% limitation, citing article 40, which would appear to
support Ecuador's right to unilaterally make such a decision. See Supreme Decree
No. 1029 of 13 July 1971, art. 2, in GRuPo ANDINO, No. 8 (1971). Article 37,
on the other hand, would appear to require ACM Commission authorization for
any deviation from 14%, regardless of the circumstances. One possibility is that
since articles 37 and 40 are in different chapters of the Common Regime, they are
not mutually exclusive, and apply to only the subject matter of their respective
chapters.
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to control balance of payments, however, the Common Regime
includes several provisions that directly affect repatriations and
external financial arrangements. Foreign investors must re-export the
capital that they have invested as they divest, and must secure
authorization for new investment. 2 Up to 5 per cent of the
company's capital may be reinvested each year without prior
authorization, but registration of such investment is required 3 and
anything over that limited percentage must be applied for as a new
investment. 84
Supervision extends to foreign loans, which may not be contracted
for at more than three points over the prevailing rate in the country of
contract, with prior authorization and registration in the appropriate
agency.8S5 In addition, access to internal credit is limited to short-term
loans, as defined by ACM regulations.8 6 No ACM country can endorse
or guarantee any foreign loan for an enterprise that has no state
participation. s7
Repatriation and credit are matters of such central concern because
foreign manufacturing investments, perhaps more than any others,
have tended to be a drain on host countries' payments credits. Unlike
extractive industries and other traditional areas of investment, import
substitution generates little or no export income at the same time that
it often relies on substantial imports of technology and inputs.8 8
Thus, the ACM planners seek to insure that while the fade-out is in
progress foreign owners do not exploit past methods of siphoning
"non-profit" funds out of the host country, and that in the future
they make a reasonable, but not unconscionable, return on investment.
The ACM is concerned with much more than just the use of
technology agreements for surreptitious repatriation of capital. Technology is probably the area of the most clearly defined dependence on
developed and industrialized nations. Experts in this field initially
point out that Latin American purchasers have little knowledge of
what they are purchasing, with little conception of alternatives or
reasonable pricing. Mauricio Guerrero of the ACM Junta legal staff
comments: "Curiously, these [technology] contracts often contain
obligations only for the concessionaire and only in exceptional cases
82. Common Regime, arts. 7-10.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Common Regime, art. 13.
Common Regime, art. 12.
Common Regime, arts. 14-16.
Common Regime, art. 17.
Common Regime, art. 15.
See Guerrero, supra note 29, at 16-17.
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impose obligations on the supplier " '9 Typical clauses have included
prohibitions against export of products manufactured with the
technology in question, the commitment to use only inputs and
personnel of the supplier, prohibitions against production of similar
products, specified volumes of production, quality control by the

supplier, price-fixing, limitations on export, commitments to turn over
improvements in technology to the supplier and so forth. All such
clauses have been flatly prohibited by the Common Regime. 9" This
may be of some help in preventing the sort of situation that Guerrero
posits, where a country provides incentives to export a given product
while at the same time a supplier of necessary technology for that
product demands in his contract with the local producer a clause
limiting or prohibiting its export.91
A larger and more difficult problem is that of how to develop an
indigenous technology to escape the crippling dependency on foreign
suppliers from industrialized nations. The Common Regime makes a
strong attempt at establishing a system that will achieve that goal, but
a foreign supplier cannot be divested of his technology in the same
way as can a foreign investment. When one considers the massive
commitments of resources and manpower necessary to maintain
constantly advancing states of the art in so many varied industries, it is
difficult to visualize a time in the near future when the ACM will be
able to free itself of reliance on foreign technology in many or most
areas.
Nonetheless, the Commission is given broad powers to activate
technological development within the ACM. This is to be done
primarily through tax and other incentives for technological research
and production, "especially that connected with the intensive use of
input items of subregional origin or those designed to make efficient
use of subregional productive factors," and some unspecified means of
channeling domestic savings into national and subregional research and
development centers.92 The Commission has also promulgated a new
Industrial Property Law for the ACM, and set up a Subregional
Industrial Property Office. 93 Member countries should favor purchases of products that include subregional technology in their
manufacture, again under Commission guidelines.9 4 Only time will

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Guerrero, supra note 29, at 20.
Common Regime, arts. 20, 25.
Guerrero, supra note 29, at 21.
Common Regime, art. 23.
Common Regime, Temporary Provisions F and G.
Common Regime, art. 24.
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prove whether the effort to develop subregional technology can
prosper. In any event, it probably represents the most ambitious of
the goals contained in the Common Regime.

V. HARMONY IN THE COMMON REGIME

The Common Regime depends for its success upon independent
application and implementation of its provisions by member countries. The significance of this fact is difficult to overestimate. As the
European Common Market's experience demonstrates,9 5 the task of
effectively harmonizing laws and policies is a formidable one. It has
already been noted that the various countries have widely divergent
legal attitudes on many of the issues dealt with in the Common
Regime. Diversity of approach is almost guaranteed in those sectors
covered by articles 40-43 of the Common Regime (basic products,
public services, financial institutions, transportation and communications) since Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have exercised their
option under article 44 to draft their own regulations for these
sectors, which are exempt from the Common Regime's restrictive
stance on foreign investment.96 Chile has not made such exemption,
most probably because it had already decided unilaterally to apply
either the ACM standards or ones more stringent in those key areas of
the economy.
Even in the manufacturing sectors at which the Common Regime
was primarily aimed, and for which no exemptions are possible, only
minimum standards of control are established. Any member country
may depart from the ACM standard to apply its own stricter
regulations. Peru, from whose recent Industries Law9" much of the

95. See, e.g., E. STELIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY
LAWS (1971); Symposium-International Unification of Law, 16 AM. J. COMP.

L. 1 (1968).
96. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
97. Decree-Law 18350 of 27 July 1970, with its companion Decree-Law
18384 of 1 September 1970. These laws instituted the "Velasco Doctrine,"
named for President Juan Velasco, of divestment of foreign investment within a
specified time period. It is of course nothing more than the application of the
theories of the economists and other prophets of dependencia cited in note 23
supra, but the tag has stuck. For analysis of the Peruvian laws, see Brisk, Pressure
Groups Under Pressure: The Peruvian Industrial Law of 1970 (paper presented at
the Rocky Mountain Political Science Association, May 7, 1971); STRASMA,
SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION

IN CHILE
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ACM system was taken, is an example. The Common Regime would
have exempted from the fade-out both companies that wished to trade
only on the domestic market rather than within the ACM and those
companies whose trade was least 80 per cent export to countries
outside the ACM. 98 Peru's legislation made no provision for such
exceptions. After some confusion" concerning whether the DecreeLaw adopting the Common Regime in Peru 1"0 incorporated the
exceptions when it stated that the ACM rules had the force of
domestic law, a ministerial letter was issued to the National Industrial
Society stating that "all foreign companies which are set up in the
country" definitely must fade out regardless of whether they
anticipate trade within the ACM. 1 0 1
Peru has also coordinated its concept of the industrial community
with the ACM's fade-out requirements. In Peru, both foreign and

domestic investment must divest by turning over company ownership
to employees at the rate of 15 per cent of profits each year, until the
employees own 50 per cent of the enterprise. 02 Since the promulgation of the Common Regime, the employees must buy the divestment
shares of the foreign investor. The method is that the company must
transfer the requisite shares to the industrial community and at the
same time issue a loan against the 15 per cent remission of annual
profits to the community.' 03 This means that in Peru the capital to
buy out the foreign investor will often be paid by the foreign investor
himself, amortizing a loan that has passed control to domestic sources
within the required time period. This also means that Peru may be
more successful than other ACM countries in finding the necessary
domestic capital to achieve divestment.

PERU 12-13, 27-29 (1971). For the official statements of policy which
went into Peru's laws, see INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE PLANIFICACI 6 N,
AND

MID-TERM

DEVELOPMENT POLICY: BASIC GUIDELINES (1970) (English
BAsIcOS DE

summary of a more complete document, LINEAMIENTOS
POLiTICA DE DESARROLLO A MEDIANO PLAZO,

published in Lima at the

same time).
98. See note 51 supra; Common Regime, arts. 27, 34.
99. See Peruvian Times, October 29, 1971, at 1; November 19, 1971, at 2.
100. Decree-Law 18999 of 20 October 1971.
101. Portions of the letter translated in Peruvian Times, February 18, 1972,
at6.
102. This is the system set up by Decree-Law 18384 of 1 September 1970.
See Brisk, supra note 97, at 18-20.
103. See Peruvian Times, October 29, 1971, at 1 (interpreting Decree-Law
18999 of 20 October 1971).
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Whereas Peru functions with the advantage of a military dictatorship, which speeds its political process considerably, ' 4 other ACM
participants have active legislative bodies. Even if the mere logistical
problems of incorporating a sweeping piece of legislation like the
Common Regime into a domestic system could be easily resolved, the
policy battles that might surface if a manifesto such as the Common
Regime were submitted to full debate in each national congress would
almost surely result in some substantive changes and an un-Common
Regime, with the ACM's Decision 24 and modifications reduced to the
function of a model act. Executives of the ACM countries, which have
thus far strongly supported the subregional effort, no doubt realize
this fact. Consequently, they have carried out virtually all ACM
matters by executive decree, avoiding legislative intervention and
consideration.' 0 1 However, a confrontation over the legislative role in
subregional integration is brewing. In Columbia, both the Supreme
Court 06 and Consejo de Estado ' have been asked to consider the
validity of the Cartagena Agreement, promulgated as a straight
executive act without congressional approval. In Chile, the Decree that
bound that country to the Common Regime was not accepted by the
Chilean Contralorla, which must review every executive decree, but
was promulgated over the non-binding Contralort'a opinion, as
provided for under Chilean law.' 08
It is difficult to predict when the problem of the proper means by
which ACM regulations should be received by member countries will
be resolved. It is almost certain, however, that the problem will not
disappear. Some tentative doctrine, or at least the focal point of the
issue, may be emerging. The Treaty of Montevideo, which created
LAFTA in 1960, has from the outset been characterized as a tratado
marco ("framework"), or a "convention which only sets out general
principles, creates mechanisms and establishes organs committed to its
goals, which fill out the full structure of the convention by action and

104. And makes it easy to issue a final Decree-Law sweeping all the questions
created by the Common Regime into a comprehensive piece of legislation. See
Decree-Law 19262 of 6 January 1972, discussed in Peruvian Times, January 21,
1972, at 4.
105. See GRuPo ANDINO, supra note 81 (collected decrees approving the
Common Regime).
106. See Consejo de Estado, Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo, Secci6n
Primera, ejecutoria of 2 March 1971.
107. The case is reported in Diario Juridico (Colombia), August 21, 1971, at
249-56; August 28, 1971, at 257-60 (one dissenting vote).
108., See the decrees and Contralora opinion in Diario Oficial (Chile), June
30, 1971, at 2485-93.
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practice." 1 09 When the eleven members of LAFTA approved the
Treaty of Montevideo, they did so by act of Congress, usually
delegating to the executive sufficient power to implement the
integrationist movement personified by that initial treaty. The
subregional movement was clearly placed in the context of LAFTA,
specifically by resolutions of the LAFTA governing body that
contemplated such a development and established guidelines for it.' 0
The Agreement of Cartagena, as the basic structural document for
subregional integration, is therefore essentially a framework within a
framework, complementary to and contemplated by the overall
integration program of LAFTA and the Treaty of Montevideo. Despite
the general nature of the subregional agreement and the extensive
preparation for it in LAFTA, its adoption by executive act has been
attacked in Colombia, probably by business interests that want to
torpedo the ACM.'1 1 The holding of the Colombian Supreme Court
was that the executive was competent to bind Colombia without
consulting Congress because the Agreement of Cartagena was a
"measure conducive to the development of the Treaty of Montevideo,
not a new treaty.., but an act of government necessary for the
evolution of the original or basic treaty, which is legally proper within
the [constitutional provisions on executive powers] .' ' 2 A determinative factor was probably the specific delegation of power by the
Congress to the executive "to adopt all conducive measures and to
create those institutes and dependencies which may prove necessary. . . for the development of this treaty" at the time the legislature
approved the Treaty of Montevideo." I
The Chilean Contralorz'a, faced with an executive promulgation of
the Common Regime, found a changed set of considerations. Its
opinion notes that the Agreement of Cartagena was also properly

109. Definition quoted by the Chilean Contraloria,supra note 108, at 2491.
For more detailed treatment of the concept of the tratado marco, see
INSTITUTO

INTERAMERICANO DE
ESTUDIOS
JURiDICOS INTERNACIONALES, DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI 6 N 842-48 (1969). JiMENEZ DE
ARECHAGA & PAOLILLO, CONTRALOR DE LA LEGALIDAD DE LOS
ACTOS COMUNITARIos, DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI 6 N, No. 1 at 11

(1967).
110. See Resolutions 100, 202, 203 and 222 of the LAFTA Conference,
synthesized by the Colombian Supreme Court in Diario Jurldico, supra note 107,

at 254-55.
111. See Wionczek, supra note 11, at 29. Wionezek also states that Japanese
and European interests refused to join in the anti-ACM movement. Id. at 28.
112. Diario Jurfdico, supra note 107, at 256.
113. Law 88 of 19 September 1961, art. 2.
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accepted in Chile by executive decree, but that at the time the
Minister of Foreign Relations appeared before the Senate to assure
that body that "to the extent [the integration process] involved the
adoption of resolutions which affect specific Chilean internal policies,
it will be necessary to enact a law." 1 1 I The Contraloriaapparently
felt that the Minister's statement was not only a correct statement of
the law, but that the circumstances of the Common Regime's
provisions, "to the extent [they] imply the modification of internal
legal regimes in full effect,"' 15 should require congressional consideration and approval, "the only sanction within our institutional system
which could give them' the
necessary force for their due application as
16
laws of the Republic."
Although the Colombian Supreme Court and the Chilean Contra-

lor(a differed in their final resolutions, one approving and one
disapproving the executive exercise, their results do not seem
inconsistent. The lesson for the future is that at some point the
judicial branch of one or several ACM countries may take up an issue
such as the validity of non-legislative approval of new ACM tax, labor,
patent, corporation or other laws and find that the domestic system,
while committed to integration as a general proposition, does not
permit the integration process to dictate its internal policies. If not,
we will have in the ACM one of the truest supranational systems in
existence. Whether the Common Regime described in this study will
be the occasion for such a test is unknown. Should such a test take
place, it will be before a body that has more than the quasi-advisory
powers of review possessed by the Contraloria.

VI. CONCLUSION
The ACM's Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital
seems to be a well-balanced set of rules representing an ambitious
attempt at reconciling national and regional development interests
with the need for foreign capital and technology on terms equitable
and remunerative to those who supply them. As in the case of
virtually every piece of development legislation based heavily on
economic theory and aimed at wholesale change of an existing
situation, the Common Regime has plunged into largely uncharted
areas in which its ultimate effects are impossible to predict. It is not,

114. Diario Oficial, supra note 108, at 2491.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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however, a "lyrical" piece of drafting.' 17 Because it is serious and
because so many other countries will observe its effects, it is
extremely important. What Latin America and the Third World do
about foreign investment in the future may likely be better measured
by observation of the Common Regime and its application than by
any other measure available.
The Common Regime is almost certainly not so bad as some United
States business interests would paint it;1 18 likewise, it is almost
certainly not so definitive an answer to the problems it contemplates
as its drafters, ACM interests, and other defenders might wish. This is
all good theater, not unfamiliar to even casual observers of the
breast-beating that goes on in inter-American relations. It is worth
noting, however, that the Common Regime is, more than perhaps
anything else, an invitation to all the participants-domestic and
foreign, public and private-in the ACM economies to reason together
and forge a mutually beneficial modus vivendi built on disclosure and
common concern.

117. See Rosenn, The Jeito, 19 Am. J. COMP. L. 514, 528-31 (1971).
118. See notes 21 and 50 supra and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., VI BOLETIN DE LA INTEGRACI6N 553 (1971) (Japan);Id.
at 379 (Canada); Id. at 551 (European Common Market).
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